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THE NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM. By ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL. New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Pp. v, 84. $1.25
(paperback).
Ernest J. Brown
October, 1969.
Dear Senator:
Permit me to commend to you Alexander Bickel's small but
valuable book, The New Age of Political Reform. Professor Bickel is
concerned, as I have been concerned, about the effects of S.J. Res. 1,
should it be approved and ratified. 1 That resolution is, as I am sure
you know, the resolution for a constitutional amendment on electoral
change proposed and supported by Senator Birch Bayh, of Indiana, and
by the American Bar Association.' I respect the purposes of those who
support S.J. Res. 1. Indeed, we are, almost all of us, so deeply imbued
with respect for the democratic process that any proposal for direct
popular election carries an appreciable momentum for acceptance.
Nevertheless, the expression of an ideal is not enough, or should not
be; we should at least be careful to examine the probable workings of
any proposal. This is the great merit of Professor Bickel's book. He
is not halted, or satisfied, simply by a call for what is termed "electoral
reform." He insists on looking to find and appraising the practical
differences, political and institutional, that the proposed "reform" will
make. And he insists on considering and appraising alternatives
where some change seems called for. If these seem attributes that are
to be expected in the consideration of any important public issue, their
presence has not been markedly notable in other discussions of the
proposed twenty-sixth amendment.
I think that our electoral experience, including particularly several
recent campaigns and elections, warns us of some of the things we
should not do at least as clearly as it indicates some of the changes that
are needed in the method of electing the President and Vice President.
I hope that you will find the following comments worthy of your cont Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1927, Princeton
University; LL.B. 1931, Harvard University. Member, New York and Massachusetts
Bars.
I See also H.J. Res. 681, a resolution similar in purpose, that was approved by
the House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 8142 (1969), on
September 18, 1969 (339 in favor, 70 opposed, 21 not voting).
2 ABA Comm'N ON ELECTORAL CoLLEa REFORM. REPORT ON ELECTING THE
PRESIDENT (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
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sideration in reaching a decision on S.J. Res. 1. Many of them reflect
Professor Bickel's ideas, but the emphasis, or order, is somewhat different. He gives emphasis and priority in discussion to the political
costs of the proposed twenty-sixth amendment. I have varied his order
and emphasis to suggest greater importance for the institutional costs.
We agree that some change is desirable, and would eliminate the individual electors and make some change in the method of choice should
no candidate receive a majority of the electoral vote. But before going
into that alternative, let me indicate the considerations that appear to
bear heavily in an evaluation of S.J. Res. 1.
I. THE RUN-OFF
In my opinion, the most unfortunate feature of S.J. Res. 1 is the
provision for a run-off election should no candidate attain forty per cent
of the popular vote. I know that Senator Bayh and the ABA Commission justify this provision by suggesting that a figure less than
forty per cent would not furnish a sufficient mandate for election to the
Presidency, and could weaken the two-party system by encouraging
the formation of splinter parties.
The evidence, I suggest, supports the conclusion that the run-off
provision would make the very results that Senator Bayh and the ABA
Commission seek to avoid more probable. We are not without experience in that area. In the southern states, the run-off is a feature
of many primary elections. One sees that in those states it is regularly
accompanied by multiple candidacies in the first primary, by the prevalence of personal factions or followings, and by party structures that
are at best very loose, even by American standards, and at worst
shadowy to nonexistent. The ABA Commission seems oblivious of
the effect of a run-off system upon party structure, even in the face
of evidence that its own report cites, but appears to misunderstand. In
connection with assertions concerning the basis of the two-party system,
its report refers to works of Key,' Schattschneider,4 and Sindler.3 Yet
if one checks those references, particularly the first two, they point
strongly to the conclusion that a plurality system of election tends to
bring into being and support a two-party organization, whereas the
requirement for a run-off encourages the formation of multiple parties,
and multiple candidacies. Perhaps even more instructive, though not
referred to by the ABA Commission, is the late V. 0. Key's notable
study, Southern Politics; references to the operation and effects of a
run-off system appear throughout the book.6 On more broadly based
&

3V. 0. KEY, POLITICS,

PARTIES,

4E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,

PARTY GOVERNMENT (1942).

PRESsURE GROUPS

5A. SINDLER, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNrE

6See V. 0.
See generally id.

(5th ed. 1964).
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(1966).
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evidence, Duverger's Political Parties reaches even firmer conclusions
on the effects of a run-off, or second-election, system.1
Cause and effect are, of course, difficult to establish beyond doubt
or argument when one considers the structure of political organization
or government. But it is not fundamentally difficult to see why the
evidence is at least consistent with, and appears rather strongly to support, the conclusion that a run-off system is destructive of two-party
organization. A plurality, one-shot election encourages coalition to
reach maximum strength. In pure abstraction, a high degree of fragmentation is a mathematical possibility. But the evidence indicates, as
one might expect, that in practice a plurality election tends to reduce
the serious contenders to two, and to give the winner either an absolute
majority or a plurality very close to an absolute majority. Most of our
governors and senators are elected in plurality elections. Any appreciable
fragmentation of the field is rare, and the winner usually achieves an
absolute majority.
But a run-off system offers attractive possibilities for a great many
candidacies. First, there is the chance that the electorate might be so
split among numerous candidates that one might achieve the run-off with
the support of only a minor fraction of the electorate. But the more
plausible goal is that even if one does not achieve first or second place
in the original contest, any substantial nucleus of support gives great
bargaining power should there be a run-off.
The objective of every candidate under a run-off system is thus,
at the minimum, to cause a run-off if he himself cannot win. How is
this best achieved? In a large and varied electorate, fractionating the
electorate along doctrinaire lines is perhaps the most effective method
of preventing any candidate's receiving the vote required to win without
a run-off. A one-issue doctrinaire candidate thus stands to profit if
other one-issue doctrinaire candidates split off enough segments of the
electorate to prevent the formation of a majority coalition. Even
though their doctrine may squarely oppose his, he is confident that he
can amass a nucleus of support sufficient to give him bargaining power
in a run-off.
Professor Bickel suggests, and I think correctly, that had the
election of 1968 been by direct popular vote, with a run-off provided,
we would have had at least one, and possibly several, additional oneissue candidates. "Every consideration that brought forth antiwar
candidates for the Democratic nomination would with equal-and
greater-validity have propelled an antiwar candidate into the general
election." 8 The leading candidates would, in all probability, have
achieved not 43 per cent of the popular vote, but some figure much
closer to 30 or 33 per cent. I think I need hardly stress the divisive
effect upon the country of a campaign conducted under such conditions.
7 See M. DuvERGER, POLITICAL PARTIEs 216-28, 239-45 (1951).
8A. Bzcmm, THE NEW AGE OF PoLITIcAL REF0pc
16 (1968)
as BicKEL].
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Moreover, the candidate who wins in a run-off hardly has a strong
mandate. This is particularly true if, as has often been the case in
run-off elections, he ran second in the first contest. The majority that
supports him in the run-off is at best a reluctant majority, and he remains substantially in pledge to those who swung support to him in
the run-off, since it has been demonstrated that he could not have won
without them. In addition, recent evidence, including some from
mayoralty run-offs, suggests that run-off elections are likely to be
particularly doctrinaire, strident, and divisive.
Because a run-off system does tend to produce multiple candidacies
and thus to divide the electorate, it is rather meaningless to cite figures,
as the ABA Commission Report does, 9 to show that in the past the
leading candidate for the Presidency has almost invariably received more
than forty per cent of the popular vote. There is little reason to think
that that would continue, once a run-off system was put in operation.
It is true that we have something of a rudimentary run-off system
at present. I refer, of course, to the fact that the elections of the
President and Vice President are transferred to the House and Senate,
respectively, if no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes. But
this type of run-off is most difficult to achieve, and has in fact not been
utilized since 1824, when there was little or no party organization or
identification. The reason for the difficulty is clear: it requires not
popular votes at large, but a nucleus of electoral votes. Professor
Bickel graphically illustrates the difference by reference to the 1948
election, when Senator Strom Thurmond and Mr. Henry Wallace
achieved almost the same number of popular votes, but Senator
Thurmond achieved thirty-nine electoral votes, and Mr. Wallace none. 10
But with a substantial regional base, and the prospect of an otherwise close election, our limited run-off system presents the occasional
invitation to divisive minor candidacies that would be regularly and
quadrennially presented by a run-off after a direct popular election. It
is clear that Governor Wallace's strategy and objective in the 1968
campaign was to deny a majority of electors, or electoral votes, to either
major candidate, and thereby to achieve great bargaining power.
Whether he hoped to achieve this by influencing electoral votes committed to him or to his discretion, or by exerting influence on House
delegations, or by both processes, does not alter the picture. By one
device or another, if he could prevent a first-round verdict, he sought
to be a President-maker. He did not succeed. I suggest that success
might have been achieved more easily by Governor Wallace, or by
some one or more other one-issue candidates, had the provisions of S.J.
Res. 1 controlled the recent election. At a time when the country suffers
from sharp divisions, we should be cautious lest, though with the best
of intentions, we encourage further division and discourage coalition.
SABA REPoRT 8.
10

BicKEL 15.
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The run-off system mandated by the proposed resolution appears
to me to present a substantial threat to the stability of our political institutions-to the pattern that requires any presidential candidate to
take a position somewhere near the center of the political spectrum, and
to build out from there, if he is to have any chance of success. But even
if one believes that a run-off system has the virtues that the ABA
Commission attributes to it, would it not be adequate, and wiser, simply
to give Congress authority to provide for a run-off, rather than making
a rigid constitutional requirement that that system be adopted? If S.J.
Res. 1 were adopted and the run-off system proved to be as unfortunate
as some of us fear, then it would require a further constitutional amendment to eliminate it. But if Congress were simply given authority to
provide for a run-off, we could adopt it, modify it, or abandon it, as
experience might dictate. Even if a run-off system were desirable, it
is difficult to believe that there is inevitable magic in the 40 per cent
figure. Experience might indicate that it would be better if the figure
were 45 per cent or 50 per cent, or perhaps even 35 per cent. One
hears no justification for freezing the particular details of the resolution
into the Constitution, even from staunch supporters of the proposal.

II.

NATIONWIDE DIRECT POPULAR ELECTION

If the run-off provision were eliminated, or even modified to make
it nonmandatory, the question of nationwide direct popular election
of the President and Vice President, as opposed to an election with the
popular vote segmented by states, would be much closer on the merits.
However, it is both important and appropriate to see what we would
gain and what we would lose by substituting a nationwide direct popular
vote for a system of segmenting the vote by states under a modification
of the present system. Not all of the arguments in support of the change
are of equal weight, and there are opposing considerations that require
appraisal.
A. The Myth of Minority Disenfranchisement
It is said that the present system of segmenting the popular vote
by states, rather than providing for a nationwide direct popular vote
"cancel[s] all minority votes cast in the state" 1 or "suppresses at an
intermediate stage all minority votes cast in a state." 12 This argument
means slightly more, but only slightly more, than saying that the losers
in an election have lost. In a statewide election for Governor or
Senator, we do not regard the votes cast for the losing candidate as
having no weight, or having been suppressed or cancelled, or those
who cast them as having been disfranchised. Those votes and voters
fully performed the function of any vote or voter in an election where a
single candidate was to be chosen. There were simply not enough of
them to elect the loser and defeat the winner. One is confident that
"1ABA REPORT 4.
12ABA REPORT

4-5.

318

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Voi.118

Senator Bayh does not regard the votes cast for Mr. Ruckelshaus for
Senator from Indiana in November, 1968, as having been cancelled or
suppressed, or the Indiana voters who supported Mr. Ruckelshaus as
having been disfranchised.
The slight base of meaning in such statements is that it is possible,
but barely possible in any practical and nonabstract sense, that a
nationwide majority or plurality of popular votes may produce only
the second highest number of electoral votes. Except as a matter of
remote mathematical chance 1 having little relation to reality or probability, this result can only come about in the event of an extremely
close popular vote. It has happened once in our history, in the very
close election of 1888.'4 Otherwise, our history of 180 years of presidential elections-many of them with very close popular votes, as in
1960 and 1968-indicates that an electoral majority follows a popular
majority or plurality, except that in percentage terms the electoral
majority tends almost invariably to be much larger than the popular.
Schattschneider has demonstrated why this is usually the case in a
districted or segmented representative election system,15 but the ABA
Report does not mention this aspect of his book.
While it may be unfortunate that there is any chance, however
slight, that the winning candidate or party in a presidential election may
have received slightly fewer popular votes than the losing candidate or
party, the presidential election is not the only area under our constitution where such a result is possible. The House of Representatives may
have a Democratic majority though the Republican candidates received
a larger total of popular votes, or vice versa. And, of course, the
majority of the members of the House will elect a Speaker, one of the
most powerful officers of our government, even though that majority
of the membership may, in the aggregate, have been chosen by a slight
minority of the popular vote. The same may be the case with that
third of the Senate chosen in any given election year, or with the
Senate as a whole. The only way to eliminate this possibility is to
have the House and Senate chosen by proportional representation and a
nationwide electorate. Few would believe that the slight risk warrants the radical remedy.
Therefore, though S.J. Res. 1 would guarantee that the candidate
who receives the largest number of popular votes becomes President
(though, with the run-off system retained, that candidate might well not
be the first choice of the majority or plurality), it accomplishes on this
Is The same type of remote mathematical chance will demonstrate that it is possible to obtain a majority in a perfectly apportioned legislature with approximately
26% of the popular vote, if the vote is distributed in just the one way that will produce
this result. For example, if a legislature has 100 seats, to obtain a majority, one party
must secure 51 seats. If that party receives no votes whatsoever for the 49 seats in
the minority, and only 51% of the vote for the seats it wins, its majority is the product
of the vote.
of 26%
1
4 See BICKEL 17.
15 E. ScHATTscHNEr ER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 74-80 (1942).
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score (its principal function) only slightly more than is for all practical
purposes completely assured by the present system.
On those occasions where the election is so close that there is some
possibility that a result similar to 1888's may come about, we must
recognize that in terms of a popular mandate, the election is, as Professor
Bickel puts it, a "stand-off, and the question is merely of a convenient
device-any convenient device previously agreed upon-for letting one
of two men govern." 16 Remembering the large number of persons who
because of illness, travel, business, weather, or similar factors may be
disabled from voting on a particular day, one must have almost a
mystical belief in the arithmetic of simple numbers to believe that under
those circumstances the result in 1888 frustrated the national will, and
was not an acceptable method of disposing of what was, in terms of
political strength, effectively a tie vote.
B. Uncertainty and Delay
Two of the three most recent presidential elections have been
extremely close in terms of the popular vote. If either election had been
conducted under the terms of S.J. Res. 1, we should not have known
the result for days or even weeks. The resultant uncertainty and its
consequences are perhaps enough to warrant some caution before deciding in favor of a nationwide direct popular vote. But the stage beyond
presents even more distressing prospects. I refer to the probability of
a nationwide contest following a close presidential election conducted
by direct popular vote.
Under our present system of segmentation by states, each segment
is insulated from the others. If a question of irregularity arises, it is
limited to a particular state. A significant contest is rendered less
likely. In 1960, some question was raised concerning the vote count in
Illinois. But even if the result had been reversed in that state, it would
have left the national electoral result unchanged, and there still would
have been no contest. We have had only one contested presidential
election, in 1876, but its history strongly suggests that repetitions are
to be avoided if possible. If one does occur, under our segmented
system, it is at least localized in a few states.
On the other hand, a close and contested presidential election under
a nationwide direct popular vote would invite opening every ballot box
and every voting machine in the nation to re-examination and challenge.
The process of contest might not stop there, considering the magnitude
of the prize. It might well require the further step of examining, subject to contest, registration records in every precinct in the country.
I think it unnecessary to depict the state of the nation-and of the
world-while such a process was in progress. We have, in recent years,
seen several state governments paralyzed during gubernatorial election
16 BIcin. 17.
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contests. The nation could hardly afford a similar misfortune, magnified to a vastly larger scale.
Consideration of the possibility of contested elections brings to
light an added disadvantage of the proposed run-off system. With forty
per cent of the vote required to avoid a run-off, the possibility of a
nationwide recount and contest to determine whether a run-off was required, is not a remote one. The result might turn upon a few tens or
hundreds of votes, even though one candidate had an obvious and substantial plurality. At this stage we would meet a complicating factor
not present even in the normal election contest. We would have to
determine accurately not only the votes received by the leading candidate or candidates, but also determine with accuracy the total number
of votes cast. For example, if it were determined, perhaps after a
recount, that the leading candidate had received exactly 32,000,000
votes, then a run-off would be required if the total vote were 80,000,001,
but not if it were 79,999,999. This would require the determination of
the validity of write-in votes, possibly illegible, possibly for unknown
persons who might be fictitious or historical characters. The total number of votes would be as significant a number, and equally subject to
contest, as the votes for a given candidate. The grounds of question
and contest would be innumerable.
C. National Primaries
One can hardly consider election procedures without giving some
thought to nominating procedures as well. Very probably, our national
party conventions, as now conducted, do not constitute an ideal nominating process, though the system undoubtedly has functions and merits
that the television cameras do not disclose. One of Professor Bickel's
most thoughtful and valuable chapters analyzes the functions of the
convention system, appraises its performance, and makes suggestions for
improving a process in which he has been personally involved. Happily,
there is movement to bring a substantial number of these improvements
into being.
If we are to adopt a system of nationwide direct popular vote for
the election of the President and Vice President, it is beyond question
that the nominating procedure must change radically. Our national
parties are coalitions or amalgams of state party units. The present
nominating system reflects that fact, and, indeed, it is based upon the
current segmented system by which the President and Vice President
are elected.
A markedly different system of election would inevitably produce
a wholly different nominating system. The nominating system, if it is
to have any meaning, must to a substantial degree reflect or be shaped
by the system of election. What it would be is difficult to predict. But
it is incumbent upon the proponents of a wholly changed election system
to give thought as well to the nominating system that would accompany
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it, and to make explicit to the public what they think that nominating
system should be.
Possibly
Some have suggested national nominating primaries.'
that would prove to be an acceptable system, but we can only speculate
on what it would produce. It appears that the cost in money and energy
would far exceed anything in our experience were we to have nationwide
primaries and elections both possibly followed by run-offs. The continuing availability of very large amounts of funds would certainly be
a pre-condition to any effective candidacy.
Such a system has one other inevitable cost. As I mentioned
earlier, our nominating and election systems have made a position at
or near the center of the political spectrum, as it may be defined at any
given time, almost always the only position having any chance of
success. A nationwide primary nominating system would bring new
factors and followings into play. It is not entirely predictable that this
would produce a political course veering sharply between left and right.
But one can say with some certainty that many of the factors now leading toward stability and gradual adjustment would be removed.
In connection with the highly uncertain shape of political institutions that would follow the adoption of S.J. Res. 1, may I recommend a
recent study by Nichols.' 8 He demonstrates how our political institutions, slowly and gropingly, over a period of almost sixty years, adjusted
to become effective under our constitutional electoral machinery. He
recounts the past, but the lesson is clear. Wholly different machinery
will call into being wholly different institutions. Unless we are quite
sure that we wish to junk our present political institutions in favor of
whatever may develop under new election machinery, an appraisal more
careful and more practical than the proponents of S.J. Res. 1 have thus
far made is clearly required.
D. Limited Virtues of the Resolution
Let me sum up the balance, as I see it, between the institutional
aspects of the nationwide direct popular election, on the one hand, and
popular election segmented by states, subject to some changes to be
noted below, on the other.
The nationwide direct popular election would eliminate the remote
possibility that in a very close election the candidate receiving the largest
number of popular votes might trail in electoral votes, and thus not be
elected. This is really the only item on the plus side contributed by
S.J. Res. 1-the elimination of a possibility that has occurred once in
180 years of presidential elections. To weigh against that, we have
(1) all the unfortunate aspects of a run-off system, (2) the enhanced
risk of uncertainty in results and of damaging election contests, and
(3) a wholly unpredictable change in our nominating procedures and in
the political institutions shaped by the nominating and electing process.
17 See id. 21-23 & app. VIII, at 74.
18
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Perhaps it is not inevitable how this balance should be struck.
However, it is my judgment, as it is Professor Bickel's, that the
weightier considerations favor the retention of a vote segmented by
states, subject to changes to be noted immediately below.
III. IMPROVEMENTS

Some changes in our system would undoubtedly constitute improvements, while causing no significant alterations in our political
institutions; almost everyone concerned with our electoral process agrees
that at least these changes should be made. The difficulty in effecting
them arises because the proponents of direct election, of the district plan,
and of the proportional plan wish to go even further in their separate
directions. These changes are:
A. Elimination of the Individual Electors
The elimination of individual electors would remove many of the
weaknesses in the present system stressed by the ABA Commission and
by Senator Bayh. It would eliminate the problem of the "faithless
elector" and the potentially more serious problem of unpledged electors.
This latter device, you will recall, was supported by Mississippi and
Alabama in 1960. In effect, it permits states having unpledged electors
to withhold their effective vote until the result in other states is ascertained. If their electoral vote is then needed to make a majority, they
gain tremendous bargaining power. It is, in effect, a variant on Governor Wallace's 1968 strategy. No one has made a substantive argument of any weight in favor of retention of individual electors.
B. Change in the Procedure Existing Today Should No
CandidateReceive a Majority of Electoral Votes
As you know, the present system, in that contingency, transfers
choice of the President from among the top three candidates to the
House, voting by states. The concept behind voting by states in the
House, with each state having one vote, may have been appropriate for
a loose confederation. Little can be said in favor of it today. Among
other faults, it may disable the House from electing at all, because of
evenly divided delegations. There is little reason why choice should
be made from among the top three rather than the top two. This may be
another factor that could disable the House from electing. Several
alternatives are possible:
1. Election by the House, with each member casting one vote.
2. Election of both President and Vice President by a joint session
of the House and Senate, with each member of either body casting
one vote.
3. Election by a plurality of electoral votes, thus eliminating the
quasi-run-off now in our system.
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I think that the second of these three alternatives would gain the
largest measure of support, and it should be entirely acceptable. It was
proposed by President Johnson, 9 was sponsored by Senator Bayh 2
before he transferred his allegiance to S.J. Res. 1, and is the choice of
Professor Bickel." However, I believe that the third alternative is
preferable, for it would strengthen our two-party system by eliminating
the incentive for any candidate primarily seeking post-election bargaining power. A majority of electors was required before we had any
party structure, when communication was difficult, and when it was
contemplated that individual electors would exercise personal choice.
Provision for a plurality choice would, I believe, consolidate the electoral
vote rather than fractionate it. While the third alternative seems the
wisest to me, either the second or the first would be completely
acceptable.
These improvements, incorporated in an amendment such as that
proposed by President Johnson and sponsored by Senator Bayh, would
accomplish another purpose of some importance. They would make
explicit in the Constitution the provision that the President was to be
elected by popular vote. It is still constitutionally possible, if politically
implausible, to have electors chosen, and the electoral vote determined,
by state legislatures or otherwise by state government process. And
such an amendment would give to Congress a regulatory power over
presidential elections similar to that which it has over elections of Representatives and Senators. At present, the constitutional basis of its
power over presidential elections is at best tenuous.I have set forth above what I consider the institutional aspects of
S.J. Res. 1, and Professor Bickel recognizes these as serious and important. But he gives initial emphasis to the great shift in political
power that would be occasioned by the adoption of the proposed twentysixth amendment.
Under the present system of giving each state the number of
electoral votes that it has members of the House and Senate, the least
populous states gain some increment in power because of their two
"senatorial" electors and by virtue of the fact that each state has at
least one member of the House, even though its population is as small
as Alaska's. On the other hand, the large blocks of electoral votes
possessed by the most populous states are the great prizes in a contest
for the Presidency. This is the result of the fact that the unit rule is
almost universal ' in the choice of electors, and that these strategically
19 See BIcK-t 20 & apps. V, VII, at 67, 72.
20 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate

Comm. on the Judiciary, Election of the President, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. & 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 18-24 (1968).
21 Bic=r 20.
22Cf. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
2 It had been universal for many years until Maine provided that a presidential
elector should be chosen from each congressional district, and two at large. Maine
P.L., Chap. 131 (1969), amending ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1181, 1184 (1964).
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vital blocks of electoral votes go as units to the winners in the several
states. How the balance between these increments of power should be
struck is not subject to exact determination, but Professor Bickel and
most observers believe that it swings substantially to the states of large
and, as is most frequently the case, varied population. A President can
hardly be elected without carrying at least some of the big and heterogeneous states, and if he carries most of them he is almost sure to
be elected. Issues that will carry the large majority of the most populous states may, and often will, elect a President. Hence, candidates
and Presidents are responsive to those states of large and varied population, and their political power is great.
It seems wholly clear that the adoption of S.J. Res. 1 would shift
power very markedly away from states with large and diverse populations towards the states with more homogeneous populations, whether
they be large, or only medium-sized-principally toward the agricultural
states of the midwest. At an earlier time, the shift of power might also
have been toward the south, but the homogeneous or heterogeneous
character of the electorate of the south is now rather uncertain.
Close elections show with some clarity the distribution of power
under one system or another, and I suggest that the election of 1960
demonstrates how different the distribution of power would be under
S.J. Res. 1. If we look at the results of that election, we see that under
direct popular election, the then Vice President Nixon's plurality in
Nebraska (6 electoral votes) alone (148,011) would have slightly more
than offset the then Senator Kennedy's aggregate plurality (147,275)
in Pennsylvania (32 electoral votes), New Jersey (16 electoral votes),
and Illinois (27 electoral votes). If we substitute Iowa (10 electoral
votes; 171,816 plurality for Nixon) for Nebraska we get an even larger
overbalancing of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Illinois, and if we substitute Kansas (8 electoral votes; 198,261 plurality) we get a still larger
overbalancing. In the same election the Indiana result (13 electoral
votes; 222,762 plurality for Nixon) would have been more than six
times as significant in the determination of the ultimate result as the
California result (32 electoral votes; 35,623 plurality for Nixon). And
the vote in Massachusetts (16 electoral votes; 510,424 plurality for
Kennedy) would have outweighed in significance the result in New
York (45 electoral votes; 383,666 plurality for Kennedy).
Such a shift in political power is not insignificant. A President
may be President of all the people, but he is likely to be particularly
sensitive and responsive to the needs and desires of the constituency
that elected him, and that may re-elect him. If we look back to some
of the significant legislation of the past eight years that required strong
presidential leadership for enactment-the Civil Right Acts of 1964
and 1965, for example--can one think that that legislation would have
been enacted if the electoral system that then prevailed had not awarded
large blocks of electoral votes to New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan?
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These political considerations may equally well supply a reason
why some should support S.J. Res. 1 as why others should oppose it.
I suggest only that one should be aware of these potential shifts of
power, whether that gives one ground for support, for opposition, or
for disregarding them as immaterial. Professor Bickel writes, I believe,
primarily to an audience that would be likely to oppose S.J. Res. 1 if it
fully understood the implications for shifts of political power. I think
that every voter and every member of Congress should be fully aware
of those political implications, whatever the direction in which they
might lead him. But I have stressed the institutional implications because, as I see the balance to be struck, those must more generally lead
voters and members of Congress to doubt the wisdom of the resolution.
I shall be grateful if you will give these matters your consideration,
and I shall be happy if you agree with the conclusions that Professor
Bickel and I have reached, though with somewhat different emphasis
on our reasons.
Sincerely yours,
ERNEST

J. BROWN

RIGHTS OF THE PERSON. By BERNARD SCHWARTZ. New York:
Macmillan, 1968. 2 volumes, pp. 1018. $25.00.
Paul W. Bruton t
With the publication of these two volumes, 1 Professor Schwartz
completes his five-volume Commentary on the Constitution of the
United States,2 the most ambitious work of its kind since the appearance
of the second edition of Willoughby on the Constitution forty years ago.
In his 1962 preface to the first two volumes, Professor Schwartz wrote:
These volumes have been written upon the assumption
that the working of the Constitution is more than the private
preserve of the legal profession. As such, they have sought
to deal with all of the important areas appropriate to a constitutional commentary-while at the same time seeking to avoid
the arid pedantry all too often characteristic of a legal treatise.
It is, to be sure, true that much of the discussion concerns
subjects that can hardly be presented with all the fluency of
popular fiction. Yet even such matters need not be obscured
in the technical vacuum of legal language. Even they can be
presented in readable fashion and in a manner that makes
t Algernon Sidney Biddle Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B.
1929, LL.B. 1929, University of California at Berkeley; J.S.D. 1930, Yale. Member,
California and Pennsylvania Bars.
I B. SCHWARTZ, RIGHTS OF THE PERSON (1968) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ].
2
The three volumes published earlier are: The Powers of Government (1963),
consisting of two volumes (Federal and State Powers and The Powers of the President); and one volume on Rights of Property (1965).
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clear their significance to those interested in the operation of
what Gladstone once termed "the most wonderful work ever
struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."
That, at any rate, is the faith upon which these volumes are
based.
These latest volumes amply attest to the fact that the author has
maintained his faith to the end. While his style may not have quite
the fluency of popular fiction, it has more of the flavor of the popular
lecture than the close-knit legal treatise. Professor Schwartz writes
well, very well, and with apparent ease-too much ease perhaps, for
there are places where the discussion becomes prolix to the point of
being repetitious, 8 and where the content does not justify the number of
pages used.4 He has a flair for apt quotation and he draws his material
from a wide range of literature, nonlegal as well as legal, but the text is
sometimes so lardered with quotations from judicial opinions that the
reader gets the impression he is perusing an anthology of judicial
rhetoric rather than an analytical commentary.
So far as coverage is concerned, the author has achieved his objective; these volumes on the civil and political rights of the individual
"deal with all the important areas appropriate to a constitutional commentary." Rights of the Person is divided into six categories which
are characterized as protections of the individual's sanctity, privacy, expression, equality, belief, and dignity. The chapter on Sanctity of the
Person is devoted to the rights of the accused in criminal cases, such as
freedom from unreasonable arrest, rights to fair accusatory procedure,
counsel, jury trial, and protection against double jeopardy, ex post facto
laws and bills of attainder. Freedom from unreasonable search and
3
E.g., 2 SCHWARTZ 766-67, where the following paragraphs appear consecutively
in the section on freedom of movement:
That Crandall rests on the broader ground of a right of national citizenship [rather than on the commerce clause] is shown by the comment of Justice
Miller (himself the author of the Crandall opinion) some two decades after
that case was decided: "in the case of Crandallv. Nevada, . . . the principle
was declared that every man in this broad country had a right to travel all
over it, for purposes of business or pleasure, regardless of State lines, and
that no state could levy a tax upon him for that privilege."
The right declared in Crandall v. Nevada as one implied from the very
nature of the constitutional system was soon elevated to one of the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference. The result is that once stated by Chief
Justice Taney: "We are all citizens of the United States, and as members
of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every
part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States."
What the right under discussion comes down to is a right to move
freely throughout the country. "All the citizens of the United States, as
members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in their own states."
The right of freedom of movement is, as just seen, one of the basic
attributes of national citizenship and, as such, protected by the Privileges-andImmunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4 See, e.g., 2 SCHaWARTZ 496-507. What is said there regarding the general standards for classification under the equal protection clause could have been well expressed
in much briefer compass.

1969]

BOOK REVIEWS

seizure is the subject of the chapter on Privacy of the Person. The
general content of the chapters on Expression of the Person and
Equality of the Person is indicated by the titles; the chapter on Belief
of the Person is concerned with religious freedom and problems of the
separation of church and state.
Although the principal theme of the first two chapters is criminal
justice and fair procedure, discussion of the basic privilege against selfincrimination is reserved for the last chapter on Dignity of the Person
where consideration is also given to the law of confessions and cruel and
unusual punishments. The utility of this division of such closely related
material between the first and last chapters is not apparent.5
A general appraisal of these volumes, like those which preceded
them, depends, however, not so much upon the topics covered and their
arrangement, as upon the depth and character of the discussion. On
this score the volumes do not measure up, in my opinion, to the
standards set by the style and rhetoric with which Professor Schwartz
writes.
Apparently this commentary was written for both a lay and a
professional audience. Perhaps it could not have been written to satisfy
entirely the needs of both, but there could have been more recognition
of the difficult problems frequently lying below the surface of judicial
rhetoric. Most notable among the omissions were the absences of any
elucidation of the judicial process in constitutional cases and of leads
to the excellent periodical literature of the last decade or two.
One of the most interesting and instructive cases in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights is Griswold v. Connecticut' holding unconstitutional the Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptive
devices and the giving of medical advice in their use. Schwartz's treatment of that case is typical of his inadequate handling of other cases.
The case is referred to at the beginning and the end of the chapter on
Privacy of the Person;" it is recognized as providing important support
for the right of privacy. Yet nothing about the judicial process by
which this "penumbral" right is said to emanate from the particular
provisions of the bill of rights is said; no mention is made of the groundbreaking discussion of the ninth amendment by Justice Goldberg
(Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring); and no reference is made
to the legal periodical literature on the subject. In re Gault,8 the recent
Supreme Court case in which the Court struggled with constitutional
requirements in juvenile court procedure is neither discussed nor cited
in the Commentary.
5 The disadvantage of such a division is shown by the discussion of the importance of preliminary examination in Volume 1, 1 SCHWARTZ 69-74, while the effect of
unlawful detention under the Escobedo-Mirandaline of authority is not explored until
the reader reaches Volume 2, 2 SCHWARTZ 864-71.

6381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172, 255-57.
8 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The case was decided May 15, 1967, apparently in ample
time to be included in the manuscript.
7 1 ScHwARTz
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The author's tendency to lay down blanket rules that smother and
hide the problems that exist in almost all areas of the law is illustrated
by his treatment of the criminal syndicalism cases. Having accurately
described the Dennis case,9 the author expresses his view that because
of the conspiritorial character of the Communist Party (described by
Justice Jackson), "it is hard to see how the highest Court can be condemned for" 'o sustaining the conviction of Dennis for conspiring to
advocate the violent overthrow of the government in violation of the
Smith Act. Whether one agrees or disagrees with this conclusion, it
is surprising to find no discussion of the Yates case. 1 While Yates did
not overrule Dennis, it certainly drew most of its teeth.
There are other examples of the author's superficial treatment of
judicially announced doctrine. For instance, he restates, at face value,
the so-called "no-evidence rule" as enunciated in the "shufflin-Sam" case
(Thompson v. Louisville 12) and the sit-in cases 13 without any indication of its relation to the doctrine of void for vagueness or overbroadness.' 4 The no-evidence rule, simply stated, is that a conviction with no
evidence to support it is a violation of due process. This implies that
the invalid conviction rested on findings of basic fact for which there
was no support in the record. This was not the situation in Thompson
or in the sit-in cases in which the Court purported to use the rule. There
the dispute was not over the basic facts, i.e., what the defendants did,
but rather concerned whether defendant's conduct could be characterized
as "disorderly" or as a "breach of the peace" and could be constitutionally punished as such. Thus the problem becomes one of the interpretation and scope of the applicable statute rather than an evidentiary question in the usual sense. Perhaps this is all too heavy to be included in
the text of the Commentary, but if so, the no-evidence rule discussion
should be omitted or at least warning flags thrown up in the footnotes
to indicate that all may not be as it seems.
Throughout both volumes the footnotes simply contain citations
to the cases and quotations appearing in the text; very little reference is
made to the rich volume of literature, periodicals and otherwise, which
has appeared in recent years on the work of the Court in the area of
civil rights. No provocative questions are asked; no alluring leads are
offered. The usefulness of the notes is further impaired by their being
9 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (holding portions of the Smith
Act constitutional as applied to Dennis, a leader of the Communist Party). See
1 SCHWARTZ 350-56.
10 1 SCHWARTZ 355.
"LIn Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the Court reversed convictions
of communist leaders under the same provisions of the Smith Act which were involved
in Dennis. The Court distinguished Dennis on a narrow ground of instructions to the
jury. Yates is merely cited in a footnote appended to the discussion of loyalty oaths.
1 SCHWARTZ 364 n.544.
12362 U.S. 199 (1960).
13 Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154
(1962); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
14 1 SCHWARTZ 128-29.
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placed at the end of each volume rather than at the foot of the page.
The table of cases causes further difficulty by referring to the page of the
text only when the case is named there; for cases cited in the notes, the
reader is referred to a footnote number which he must then find in
the text.
An author is entitled to have his work judged from the viewpoint
of the readers he intended to reach. I assume that the Commentary was
written for the professional audience as well as the general reader. My
difficulty with these volumes is that they seem to fall between two
stools, being too weak a dose for the first group and too heavy a one
for the second.
PUBLIC CONTROLS FOR NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS. EDITED
Chicago: The University of Chicago
BY DONALD ERICKSON.
Press, 1969. Pp. 5, 242. $8.50.
HarrellRodgers t
Public Controls for Nonpublic Schools is a compilation of nine
papers presented at a conference on "State Regulation of Nonpublic
Schools," held at the University of Chicago early in 1967. The primary
stimulus for the conference was the Amish controversy then boiling in
the State of Iowa. Delegates were a diversified group consisting of
three college professors, one governor, one college president, one attorney, one state commissioner of education, and one student. Other
participants included religious leaders, scholars, and political officials.
Drawn together to discuss the problems of regulation of nonpublic
schools, the participants grappled with a central issue:
How can nonpublic education be both responsible and free?
Responsible to serve the public interest; free to experiment
and disagree. Without regulation, some schools may victimize patrons and endanger the general welfare. With regulation, dissent is jeopardized. Where should the balance be
struck? 1
Governor (now Senator) Harold Hughes of Iowa opened the discussion by relating his role in, and attitudes toward, the Amish dispute
(then current and unsettled) in his state. This controversy raged
around the refusal of a handful of Amish families to hire certified
teachers for two private schools which they operated in eastern Iowa.
Following a description of his role in the delicate negotiations between
the Amish and local officials, Hughes concluded that in such controJ'Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia.

Professor

Rodgers is the author of Commnity Conflict, Public Opinion, and the Law: The
Amish Dispute in Iowa.
1
PUBLIC CoNmoLs FOR NoNpuBLIC ScHooLs 2 (D. Erickson ed. 1969) (here-

inafter cited as Erickson).
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versies, there may be no adequate solution. Torn between the duty to
enforce the law and a sympathy for those unwilling persons upon whom
it must be imposed, officials, acting in good conscience, can only seek
accommodation. Compromise may not be logical in terms of the law,
but it protects the conscience of those who would be different, without
irreparably damaging any state interest. In such a case, Hughes explained: "Personally, I am more willing to bend laws than human
beings." 2
In the second paper presented to the conference, the editor of
Public Controls, Donald Erickson, offers a lucid, if somewhat polemic,
account of the more dramatic episodes in the Amish dispute. His point
is obviously to demonstrate the degree of oppression that state regulation of nonpublic schools can impose, and the insensitivity of local
officials that can magnify the oppression. Inclined to see the dispute
almost entirely from the Amish point of view, he disagreed with Governor Hughes's conclusion that local officials acted in good faith. To
combat any notion of good faith on their part, he even managed to
invent a small conspiracy on the part of local officials against the Amish.
One must infer from both his zealous attack on officialdom and his
absolute defense of the Amish that he would view the case for more enlightened regulation of nonpublic schools as strengthened if the Amish
emerged completely vindicated and local administrators were severely
restricted in their authority. But his enthusiasm in establishing his
case causes Erickson to make many questionable judgments and some
grossly inaccurate statements. For example, he refers at one point to
Amish society as "one of the most tranquil known to man." ' Yet,
there is considerable evidence that this description is inaccurate. In
his book Amish Society, John Hofstetler (professor of sociology, former
Mennonite, and delegate to the conference) reports that "among the
Amish the rate of suicide is just as high, if not higher, than for the
nation." ' He adds that certain physical disorders, such as obesity,
chronic bedwetting, digestive disturbances, and mental disorders tend
to occur more often among the Amish than non-Amish.5 Erickson's
rhapsodizing is not only suspect, but unnecessary and ill-advised. Although the need for more enlightened regulation of nonpublic schools
is crucial, one's personal attitudes toward the groups to be regulated
is not relevant to resolutions of the problems.
Franklin Littell, President of Iowa Wesleyan College, offers a more
useful contribution to an understanding of the Amish position. He
examines their religion, traditions, and cultural orientation in order to
show how the Amish approach to education differs from the more
traditional approach of their non-Amish neighbors. Emerging clearly
2Id. 10.

3Id. 164.
4J. HOFSTETLER,

5 Id. 275.

AmIsa Soc=rv 284 (1st ed. 1963).
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from his paper is the concept that minority groups may have serious,
legitimate educational goals that differ from those of the larger society,
and that imposition of standard educational procedures on them will
only result in resistance.
Although the conference was precipitated by the Amish crisis, the
problems with which it dealt were not confined to any one group.
Therefore, as the conference progressed, the contributions became more
general and more intriguing. For example, John Elson, the only
student member, examined the reasons underlying regulation of nonpublic schools. Having first considered the rationale for regulation, he
proceeded to review the legal framework provided by decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States and various state courts. Most
judicial policy, he concludes, is weighted in favor of state regulation:
Federal and most state courts profess extreme reluctance to
hold statutes governing educational matters unconstitutional
unless they directly conflict with significant First Amendment
interests. 6
Norman Dorsen, a well known civil liberties scholar, continued this
general analysis by examining racial discrimination in private schools.
He dealt with such problems as the use of private schools in southern
states to avoid the dictates of Brown v. Board of Education,7 the legal
problems that some nonpublic schools face in accepting black students,
and the relation of church-related schools to the difficulties of integration.
His conclusion is that sufficient "law" exists to enable an enterprising
court to hold that private schools are also subject to the constitutional
command to desegregate.
While Littell and Dorsen deal with the more specific instances of
regulation, Erickson, in his second contribution, assumes the enormous
task of prescribing how laws might be written to contend with the
totality of complex problems involved in regulating nonpublic schools.
If public control is to be beneficial, but freedom to differ is still to be
retained, more flexible statutes are needed to temper the present imperative status of compulsory education legislation. Erickson offers a hypothetical statute as a resolution of the competing considerations of freedom and control:
Nonpublic schools shall be permitted to function within the
meaning of the compulsory attendance law, primarily to prepare children to participate in dissenting communities whose
cultures have proven viable in the modern world, provided that
these communities are not characterized by indigence, crime,
anarchy, or subversive doctrines and are not seriously burdening the state with defectors who have difficulty adjusting to life
in more complex settings 8
I Erickson 133.
7347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 Erickson 171-72.
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In his attempt to ease all of the difficulties of minority groups by
one statute, the editor creates more problems than he solves. The
ambiguity of the statute, for example, would allow state officials to
close any school without cause. It is questionable whether the Amish
could survive the implementation of such a statute, since it is not clear
that their culture is "viable in the modern world." Another crucial
defect in the statute is that it is designed to protect only established
minorities; new minority groups are left with no safeguard. If we
seriously intend to allow pluralistic goals and divergent attempts at
achieving those goals in nonpublic schools, the standards used to regulate such schools will have to be drawn very cautiously, perhaps as
cautiously as those standards used to regulate first amendment rights.
The remaining contributors to the conference offer a variety of
ideas, some useful, and others of little substance. Falling into the latter
category is the paranoid attack on nonpublic schools by Jules Henry.
His thesis is that the motivation for regulation is purely economic.
Since the austere life of the Amish would threaten the gross national
product, he believes that public officials fear their ideas and therefore
desire to regulate them. More constructive commentary is offered by
William Ball, who admonishes some of his Catholic brethren for their
willingness to accept public aid for their schools. He argues that even
when these schools do accept public aid, they should only be subject to
state or federal standards in those areas supported by the funds.
Perhaps the only point agreed upon by the members of the conference was that future regulation of nonpublic schools must be better
planned and more sensitive to the rights of those regulated. This point
is well taken. If state regulation is complicated now, it will be doubly
so in the future. Consider, for example, the increasing number of communes springing up across the country. Many of these communities
will want to educate their members in their own manner. Black
nationalist groups are also considering educating black children in
private schools run by their members. Regulating these schools will be
difficult. Considerable courage will be required on the part of political
officials to allow these groups as much freedom as possible to experiment
and question the basic premises of our society.
Public Controls for Nonpublic Schools is useful in one respect; the
very fact that it is published shows some concern for the perplexing
problems which the book so poorly treats. Unfortunately, as is often
true in a conference in which participants submit position papers, the
contributors are unresponsive to each other's arguments. If there is any
continuity in the book, it is the product of happenstance. Yet during
the course of the disjointed presentations, crucial questions are asked,
and at times, albeit rarely, useful answers are suggested. Hopefully,
this work will produce more cogent arguments in the future and encourage many of those who contentedly form the "majority" to question
whether they truly desire a uniform system of education.

